Implementing change using the goldilocks principle

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ABSTRACT

There is an ideal time to get things done, the right time for accomplishing things, including implementing change. This paper looks at realizing change that differs significantly from the status quo and offers a slight modification from the classic three-step change model that entails creating the perception that a change is needed (i.e., unfreezing) then moving toward the new, desired level of behavior (i.e., change), and finally solidifying that new behavior as the norm (i.e., refreezing). We submit that organizational unfreezing is most effective when exogenous radical activists attempt to superimpose a significant shift from the current state (second-order change) followed by incremental change efforts by moderate insider activists (first-order change) who present their ideas and beliefs in ways that are less threatening and more appealing to mainstream audiences. Such effects are discussed in terms of sequential compliance-giving techniques of foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face, and radical flank effects using the lens of perceptual contrast.

Keywords: change management, organizational change, perceptual contrast effect
INTRODUCTION

1 There is a time for everything, and a season for every activity under the heavens:
2 a time to be born and a time to die,
3 a time to plant and a time to uproot,
4 a time to kill and a time to heal,
5 a time to tear down and a time to build,
6 a time to weep and a time to laugh,
7 a time to mourn and a time to dance,
8 a time to scatter stones and a time to gather them,
9 a time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing,
10 a time to search and a time to give up,
11 a time to keep and a time to throw away,
12 a time to tear and a time to mend,
13 a time to be silent and a time to speak,
14 a time to love and a time to hate,
15 a time for war and a time for peace.

—Bible, Ecclesiastes 3:1-8

In the book of Ecclesiastes in the Bible as well as in the 60’s rock song “Turn! Turn! Turn!” by the Byrds (Wikipedia.org), there is a time for each and everything thing. Many theologians believe that the book of Ecclesiastes was written by King Solomon, and as can be seen in the text, there is an appropriate time for everything. The timing of activities is often significant. As an example, killing someone (verse 3) is a crime but not in wartime, when serving in defense of your country. Similarly, dancing (verse 4) may be appropriate in many circumstances but might not be suitable at a funeral. An individuals’ actions and the timing of those actions are notable. For everything, including organizational change efforts, there is a season—an appropriate time to act.

We discuss this by first presenting three dimensions of change in the business literature: kinds of organizational change, forces for change, and types of change agents. We then review three significant sequential request compliance strategies: foot-in-the-door (FITD), door-in-the-face (DITF), and the radical flank effect. We then present three general steps (unfreezing → change → refreezing) frequently recognized in organizational change research first stated by Levin (1951) and endorsed by many change theorists although with some variants (e.g., Kotter, 2012). We then focus on steps one and two by proposing that extreme actions promoted by radicals may undermine their effectiveness but indirectly increase the credibility of moderates who are then able to secure the desired change by attracting more casual and mainstream individuals. We then conclude with a summary.

THE THREE KEY FEATURES OF CHANGE

For our purposes, there are three key change dimensions that have relevance to this manuscript: types of change, forces for change, and kinds of change agents. We discuss these dimensions below.
Types of organizational change

Harvey and Brown (2001) suggested that in the rapidly changing environment of the 21st century, organizations are confronting high rates of change. They face constant innovation in computing and information technology and a chaotic world of changing markets and consumer lifestyles. In responding to such environments, there are often two change strategies that are debated in the organization literature: first-order change and second-order change. This distinction was first articulated by Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974) and Bateson (1972) and continues to contribute to change theory construction and data collection (Bartunek & Moch, 1987) although organization theorists use different terms; for example, evolutionary change and revolutionary change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), continuous and episodic change (Weick & Quinn, 1999), and incremental and discontinuous change (Nadler & Tushman, 1995).

First-order change

First-order change can be thought of as a process that modifies, adjusts, or refines the status quo via relatively simple and minor changes. Based on this definition, it is important to emphasize that this kind of organizational change does not alter an organization’s core. Incremental change refers to relatively minor adjustments to pre-existing systems, hierarchies, models, products, services, and processes. First-order changes often involve modifying existing products, processes, and company culture. An example of an incremental change in an organization can be something like the installation of new computer software to improve a company’s efficiency.

Second-order change

Second-order change, back-to-the-drawing-board change, on the other hand, refers to a significant shift behind the fundamentals of a company’s practices, products, culture, norms and is much larger in scope than first-order incremental, adaptive changes. Very often, second-order change refers to a dramatic evolution of some basic structure of the business itself—its strategy, culture, organization, physical structure, supply chain, or processes. Second-order transformational change is often sudden and dramatic and is often pursued to address a major concern or challenge the business is facing. This type of change is typically accompanied by large power shifts, and on occasion the impact may be cataclysmic. Examples of second-order change include implementing major strategic and cultural changes involving reorganizations, downsizing, rightsizing, reengineering, or adopting radically different technologies. Table 1 below provides a description of these two common types of change found in the management literature.

The outlook offered here is that both change types are necessary and that their timing or sequencing is important. Indeed, the need for organizations to undertake both first- and second-order change is widely accepted (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009; Wang & Li, 2008). Organizational survival will likely depend on the ability of management to negotiate both first order and second-order transitions (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Rather than radical vs. incremental change, we believe that radical change exigencies perceived as revolutionary are often required initially followed by incremental change endeavors. Such change pressures can occur from within or outside an organization.
Table 1. A Common Distinction in the Change Management Literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First-Order Change</th>
<th>Second-Order Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Incremental</td>
<td>Radical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Discontinuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>Transformational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micro</td>
<td>Macro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piecemeal</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small, gradual changes</td>
<td>Fundamental change in strategy,</td>
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<tr>
<td>(small wins)</td>
<td>structure, operations, and culture</td>
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Forces for change

A second key dimension of organizational change includes strategic, operational, and technological change that can come from inside or outside the organization.

Inside forces

Internal forces of change arise from inside the firm and relate to the functioning of the organization. They might include low performance, low satisfaction, conflict, or the introduction of a new mission, new leadership, etc.

Outside forces

Factors from outside the company can trigger change within the organization and usually beyond control of the company. This external environment is composed of customers, competitors, technology, the economy, governmental, political, societal conditions, and resources that are typical external factors that can influence an organization. Although external environment activities occur outside the organization, they can significantly influence current operations and growth, as well as long-term sustainability. Such change efforts are often undertaken by different kinds of change agents.

Types of change agents

Most efforts to change the status quo within an organization encompass a minority group movement challenging a majority. Successful change campaigns against the dominant perspective often begin with the most radical members however, their ideas and ideals will usually be too passionate for others to follow their lead. Change efforts initiated by the organization may be more effective when extremists tone down their rhetoric, be less confrontational, and present ideas and beliefs in less outrageous ways and less shocking in order to appeal to mainstream audiences and recruit moderate members to the movement. These two types of change advocates are discussed in greater detail below.
External activists

Radicals, often outside an organization, tend to make revolutionary demands rather than small requests for reform to existing systems. Outsider activists typically coalesce around social or environmental issues that are deemed important by the activists and their societal constituents (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016). Examples include environmental groups seeking to reduce pollution focus on manufacturers with weak environmental records; those with anti-sweatshop concerns organize boycotts of apparel brands based on the treatment of workers in their supply chains, and community activists who mobilize to oppose industrial sites, and pressure companies to increase financial support for local disaster victims (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016).

The radicalism of actors is generally defined in terms of the degree of legitimacy that is imputed to their objective, rhetoric, and tactics by relevant external audiences (Haines, 2013). Such tactics often include extreme actions perceived to be highly troubling and possibly unethical (Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2020). Examples of such behavior include inflammatory or threatening language, blocking traffic, damaging property, and physical violence (Goldman & Hogg, 2016). According to Snow and Cross (2011) “... an activist who embraces direct action and high-risk options, often including violence against others, to achieve a stated goal” (p. 118) is radical. They challenge extant systems of authority in which they are embedded. Radicals introduce a new way of conceiving reality in place of the existing one (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). They may, metaphorically speaking, use the “burning-platform logic” where people who are most solidly content with the status quo will act differently if a fire starts on the floor beneath their feet. With fire spreading around them everyone moves, the status quo is then eliminated, and a new beginning is possible.

Outsider activism against corporations often relies on disruptive tactics as the primary means of gaining influence (Bartley, 2003; Hendry, 2006; King, 2008). Typical disruption tactics often include lawsuits, product boycotts, blocking access or entry, sit-ins designed to disrupt meetings or work schedules, sabotaging equipment, and picket line protests (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Hendry, 2006; Schurman, 2004; Zietsma & Winn, 2007). These disruption tactics also have the added advantage of garnering further media attention, drawing increased public attention to the activist group issue (Schurman, 2004). Some radicals attempt to unfreeze people by engaging in “doomsday management” (Greenberg, 2011, p. 558) to create a sense of urgency by introducing the idea that there is an impending crisis although, in reality, conditions are currently acceptable. While lying is inappropriate and is bound to be ineffective long term, the practice of emphasizing the troublesome aspects of a situation in the short term may help create a sense of urgency that prompts action. As an illustration, consider the activities of environmental activist Bill McKibben who published an article in Rolling Stone magazine in opposition to the fossil-fuel industry and the industry impact on climate change (McKibben, 2012; Schifeling & Hoffman, 2019). McKibben presented the concept of “divestment” to the particularly contested United States climate debate. Successful divestment campaigns over apartheid in South Africa and the tobacco industry here in the United States served as a model (Apfel, 2015), to call upon investors, particularly investors responsible for management of college and university endowments, to liquidate stocks and bonds in addition to investment funds from companies engaged in extracting fossil fuels and to “keep carbon in the ground” (350.org, n.d.).
Internal activists

Internal actors (employees) find themselves more constrained in voicing their grievances and persistent in their goals because of their reliance on the organization for key resources and the limited bargaining power connected to the threat of withdrawing resources from productive use by the target organization (Commons, 1934; Hirschman, 1970). They must be careful in using disruptive tactics such as boycotts or public shaming to pressure firms (Bartley & Child, 2014) to change because of the high liability of being too radical or disturbing in their own workplace (Scully & Segal, 2002). Indeed, those too may be perceived as whistleblowers who speak out about perceived risky, illegal, unethical, dangerous, or what they see as unacceptable practices in their workplaces. This behavior makes them at risk of retaliation from colleagues or employers (Bjørkelo, 2013; Premeaux & Bedeian, 2003), and such retaliation appears to be increasing (Ethics Resource Centre, 2014). Examples of retribution can take a number of forms including demotion, decreased quality of working conditions, threats by senior staff, allocation of menial duties to the whistleblower such that their job becomes degrading, harassment, referral to psychiatrists, outright dismissal from work, prolonged legal challenges, and schemes aimed at stigmatizing the individual through character assassinations or accusations of being disgruntled employees or spies (Kenny, Fotaki, & Scrivener, 2019).

These organizational actors often called “insider activists” (Buchter, 2020, p. 1), inside agitators (Einstein, 1996), institutional activists (Pettinicchio, 2012), issue sellers (Dutton & Ashford, 1993), institutional intrapreneurs (Waeger & Weber, 2017), and “tempered radicals” (Meyerson & Scully, 1995, p. 586), soften their tactics to achieve change (from changing organizational norms to policy reform). What these terms have in common is that they refer to workers who challenge practices of their organizations, voice their concerns, and who use a repertoire of moves to influence and garner the attention of key organizational decision-makers in a more subtle or understated manner. Internal activists are typically lower and mid-level employees (Caldwell, 2003; Chia, 2014; Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, & Travis, 2007) and are often considered insiders working on outsider causes (Santoro & McGuire, 1997).

Sometimes employees are able to gain influence and push an agenda through collective action inside the firm. Some examples of employee activist groups (internal networks) include the Xerox Corporation Black Caucus, the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Employees of the Ford Motor Company, the Pilots Pension Preservation Organization of Delta Airlines, the Women in Science and Engineering of Cisco Systems, and other employee groups formed to advocate for causes ranging from environmental reforms and increased worker safety to religious accommodation in the workplace (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016). A noteworthy example is the LGBT workplace movement, where employees create groups urging companies to offer health insurance for domestic partners, provide assurances of anti-discrimination, and recognize equal rights for LGBT employees (Creed & Scully, 2000; Raeburn, 2004). Additional examples include efforts of medical residents toward work-life balance and ensuring patient safety (Kellogg, 2011), and efforts to reform corporate environmental practices (Soderstrom & Weber, 2020).

Internal activists are change agents who attempt to change systems and structures from within but do not fit in completely because they are different in one way or another from the norm although they do not necessarily act differently than normal. Rather than working to dismantle systems, they work from within to strengthen them. They push against opposing organizational or cultural norms, but their actions are mitigated. They “... work to effect
significant changes in moderate ways” (Meyerson, 2001a, p. 39) and act quietly challenge prevailing wisdom and gently nudge their organizational cultures to adapt and to effect significant changes in moderate ways. Meyerson (2001b) sees them as “everyday leaders” who are “… quiet catalysts who push back against prevailing norms, create learning, and lay the groundwork for slow but ongoing organizational and social change” (p. 6). “They recognize modest and doable choices in between, such as choosing their battles, creating pockets of learning, and making way for small wins” (Meyerson, 2001b, p. 6; see also Soper, Von Bergen, & Sanders, 1996; Weick, 1984 for a discussion of small wins). They push and prod the system through a variety of subtle processes, rechanneling information and opportunities, questioning assumptions, and changing boundaries of inclusion. The changes they introduce are mostly incremental. Internal activists are ambivalent, cautious promoters, and they are content with small victories that, over time, lay the groundwork for something grander. They are effective in selling issues, the process in which individuals within an organization bring ideas or concerns, solutions, and opportunities together in ways that focus others’ attention and invite action. They are conservative in that they soften potentially radical ideas, gently influence their listeners by introducing issues to them slowly, and tailor their presentations to the organization’s culture and overall strategy (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001).

SEQUENTIAL COMPLIANCE-GAINING TECHNIQUES

External and internal change agents can influence organizations in several ways. We now discuss the tactics and processes these change agents use to impact firms.

External activists

Scholars have extensively studied how such social movement actors outside the firm may change organizations exogenously (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010; King & Pearce, 2010; Soule & King, 2006). Sociologists McCarthy and Zald (1977) define a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (p. 1212). Understanding how social movement actors influence change within organizations is important.

Nearly all social movements divide into “radical” and “moderate” groups during their development, though the understanding of those labels continually changes (Haines, 1984). This separation has developed in the labor movement (Rayback, 1966), the anti-nuclear movement (Barkan, 1979), the women’s movement (Freeman, 1975), the environmental movement (Hoffman, 2009), and the Black revolt in the United States (Allen, 1969). Often it is the more extreme positions that first develop. For example, Ewen (1976) and Ramirez (1978) indicated that labor movement demands for an eight-hour workday and collective bargaining only became negotiable early in the 20th century following socialist threats toward capitalism.

Facing a powerful threat by radical members of a group, other members of the organization may start to alter their approaches toward the radical’s demands, distinguish between the goals of radical compared to the moderate challengers within a firm, and work together with the moderate challengers attempting to retain as much power as they can and prevent more significant changes radical challengers demanded (Haines, 1984). This is comparable to the compliance-gaining strategy of door-in-the-face (DITF) coming from the social psychology literature. This technique stipulates that the initial request must be quite large,
such that most people would refuse it. The second request consists of asking for compliance to a comparatively more moderate request. The second appeal is in fact the target behavior. Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler, and Darby (1975) are credited with the first investigation of this phenomenon. In a series of three studies they clearly demonstrated the ability of DITF to increase the probability of compliance. Their findings showed that subjects who refused a first unambiguously large request were twice as likely to comply with the second more moderate appeal. This type of sequential request involving “rejection-then-moderation” (Cantrill, & Seibold, 1986, p. 254) is applicable to a wide variety of compliance-gaining situations including the radical demands by organizational outsiders leading to compliance of the requests of more moderate organizational insiders. A similar approach coming from social movement research is referred to as the radical flank effect.

**Radical flank effect**

Freeman (1975) coined the term “radical flank” regarding more revolutionary and radical women’s groups, “against which other feminist organizations and individuals could appear respectable” (p. 236). Freeman (1975) contended that in the late 1960s and early 1970s conventional women’s reform organizations would have been discounted as extreme if there not had been more radical groups. It appears that socialist feminists and lesbian feminists have enhanced the bargaining position of moderate groups such as the National Organization for Women. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988) describe the radical flank effect as the idea that radical groups can gain greater acceptance for those who are less radical (i.e., moderates) by making them and their demands appear more reasonable and their policies more mainstream.

Building on Freeman’s finding, Haines (1984) also found a radical flank effect when Black militancy gained momentum and sought revolution in the 1960s resulting in increased financial support by white groups of more moderate civil rights Black organizations that pursued assimilation and reform. Such a finding is consistent with Elinson (1966), Hough (1968), Meier (1965), and Oberschall (1973) who believed that black radicalism enhanced the respectability of established moderate leaders. As an example, in the 1960s when Martin Luther King, Jr. began speaking, his message was perceived as too extreme for mainstream White America. However, when Malcolm X joined the debate, the radical flank extended. By comparison, Dr. King’s message appearing much more moderate. Similarly, Bernie Sanders’ challenge in the 2016 Presidential election compelled Hillary Clinton’s campaign to promote more moderate alternatives to Sander’s radical issues, as with her embracing stronger standards for trade deals. It appears that radicals strengthen the influence of moderates, who in turn provide a pathway for change to move forward.

Radicals can provide the impetus for which moderate strategies and demands become refined and normalized—i.e., treated as “reasonable” (Haines, 1984, p. 32). Chenoweth and Schock (2015) argued that radical factions positively impact the effectiveness of more moderate groups by indirectly increasing the credibility of more moderate parties. Relative to the radicals’ approach non-radical actors can cast the actions in a more favorable light. In effect, members of a radical flank can provide legitimacy to what previously were radical fringe ideas by offering more extreme ideas that widen the debate but are unlikely to become accepted themselves (Schifeling & Hoffman, 2019).

**Internal activists**
Inside activists often use the sequential compliance-gaining technique of what is called the foot-in-the-door (FITD) strategy where agreeing to a small request (i.e., get a foot in the door) raises the possibility of agreeing to a larger request. Initially internal activists make a small request and once the target agrees to this further compliance with requests would be more likely and significantly greater (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Sequence of efforts by these compliance-gaining change agents is important.

These compliance-gaining techniques appear to be just another example of the ubiquitous perceptual contrast effect and its impact on how individuals’ perception of new information is based upon exposure to prior information.

**PERCEPTUAL CONTRAST EFFECT**

The compliance-gaining effects above (i.e., FITD, DITF, and radical flank) may be understood using the perceptual contrast effect. Perceptual contrast is a perceptual bias and is defined as a shift of the evaluation of a stimulus away from the evaluation of the preceding stimulus (e.g., see Baccus & Meister, 2004). It is a cognitive bias that distorts a perception of something when it is compared to something else, by enhancing the differences between them. One of the oldest examples of the perceptual contrast effect involved three buckets of water. Bucket 1 contained ice cold water. Bucket 2 contained hot water. Bucket 3 contained room temperature water. Experimenters placed opposite hands into the cold and hot buckets for a certain amount of time. Then they took both hands out and placed them into the same bucket containing room temperature water. The cold hand felt hot and the hot hand felt cold. The same temperature induces different sensations based upon each hand’s prior environment. The point is that the same thing—in this instance, room-temperature water—can appear to be very different depending on the preceding event. Likewise, sweet drinks generally taste sweeter if they are consumed immediately after drinking something that is less sweet, compared to when they are consumed right after drinking something sweeter (Lawless, Horne, & Spiers, 2000). Everything, it seems, is relative.

Thus, if an extreme stimulus is first presented, then a move to a less extreme (moderate) stimulus is reliably found. Such sequential timing effects are consistent with much research in the psychological physical scaling and perceptual identification areas demonstrating that the response to a given stimulus depends on the stimulus that came before (Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Jones, Love, & Maddox, 2006; Petrov & Anderson, 2005; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005). The perceptual contrast explanation asserts that the initial petition employed in the FITD, the DITF, and radical flank effect acts as an anchor against which further requests are assimilated or contrasted; i.e., targets of sequential techniques use initial requests as standards for interpreting the acceptability of critical requests in such ways as to form an impression that the critical requests are more reasonable than they would be if an anchoring request were not present. Timing is important.

**A THREE-STEP GENERAL MODEL OF CHANGE**

Despite unique differences found in various situations, in one way or another, the process of change involves the following three steps (see Figure 1; Greenberg, 2011). Individuals familiar with change will recognize the contribution of Lewin (1951) which is regarded by many as the classic or fundamental approach to managing change (Cummings, Bridgman, & Brown,
Indeed, many in the business literature accept this three-step model as a foundation upon which the field of change management is built (Robbins & Judge, 2009; Sonenshein, 2010; Waddell, 2007). As Hendry (1996) notes, “Scratch any account of creating and managing change and the idea that change is a three-stage process which necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing will not be far below the surface. Indeed, it has been said that the whole theory of change is reducible to this one idea of Kurt Lewin’s” (p. 624).

Unfreezing is the first stage where a recognition of the need for change is revealed and generates urgency that triggers action to alter the status quo. The next stage is to implement modifications (ambitious or minor) to create more desirable states. The third stage is refreezing which means taking actions to reinforce and support the change introduced earlier. Figure 1 below depicts this process.

![Figure 1. A Typical Model for Organizational Change](source)

Source: adapted from Greenberg, 2011 and Lewin, 1951.

Here we focus on the first step of this model and one of the most significant stages in the whole change management process. We believe that at the beginning of a change effort of any importance, if a sense of urgency is not significant, then everything else becomes so much more difficult often leading to failure, pain, and disappointment. We support the above change template but believe it is important to add to the unfreezing step an elaboration of Kotter’s (2008) suggestion that urgency can be created by finding opportunity in crisis. When emergency arises, management can use that opportunity to learn, act, and grow. Kotter (2008) discusses the “burning-platform” metaphor where “… people who are most solidly content with the status quo will act differently if a fire starts on the floor beneath their feet. With the fire spreading around them, everyone moves, the status quo is then eliminated, and a new beginning is possible” (p. 120). We believe that organization radicals can figuratively create such a fire and generate the initial impetus to change, but that “tempered radicals,” more moderate change supporters, are necessary to move an organization from an existing comfort zone to a proactive, flexible, and solutions-driven organization.
CONCLUSION

The Goldilocks principle is taken after a British children’s story “The Three Bears”. A young girl named Goldilocks is the focus of this 19th century story. Goldilocks wanders into a house in the woods and tastes three separate bowls of porridge. She finds that she prefers porridge neither too hot nor too cold, but the porridge with just the right temperature. “Just the right amount” is a concept that is easily understood and can be applied to a large range of disciplines, including astronomy, biology, developmental psychology, economics, and engineering. Regarding our view of change, this principle suggests that those radicals who start a change undertaking may be too hot for most people and that to gain adherents to the proposed change it is helpful to temper the cause and offer a message that is neither too hot nor too cold but one that is “just right”—which moderates offer. These individuals tone down the extremism of the radicals by presenting their ideas and beliefs in less shocking ways and appearing more attractive to mainstream audiences. These more moderate activists can overcome the skepticism of potential key stakeholders who often find revolutionaries’ thoughts and actions threatening and undesirable.
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